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Sunday, August 10, 2014

WILL UMNO ALLOW IT! Keep sultan out, let state reps decide

WILL UMNO ALLOW IT! Keep sultan out, let state reps decide
In resolving any crisis, we must bear in mind the bigger picture so that we will not create a bigger crisis in resolving a smaller one. We must understand how the system works and not to miss the wood for the trees because of our indulgence in technicalities.
In the brewing Selangor MB crisis, we must then ask: what is our political system? What should we aim to protect in resolving the crisis, as institutions should not be simply bended just to keep or sack a person.
The answer to the first question is that we are a parliamentarian system by virtue of being a constitutional monarchy. The answers to the second question then become very clear too:
a) Separation of state and government (executive) with the head of state staying above partisan politics.
b) Strong parties which allow parliamentarian democracy to be functional and responsible.
Constitutional monarchy is often defended in Malaysia as an ethnic institution of the Malay-Muslims. It should be defended institutionally as it is arguably superior in term of executive-legislative relations or state-executive separation.
Putting aside the hybrid and rare types, democracies can be divided into two broad categories: presidentialism and parliamentarianism. Parliamentarianism can be further divided into two variants: parliamentary republic and constitutional monarchy.
The shortcomings of presidentialism are well debated in political science but I want to draw attention to the eloquent defence of constitutional monarchy - generically, parliamentarianism - by British constitutional expert Walter Bagehot, incidentally also the third editor-in-chief of the Economist.
Bagehot separates a government into two parts: the dignified and the efficient. The dignified parts “excite and preserve the reverence of the population”, while the efficient parts “works and rules”.
In a constitutional monarchy, the head of state - a hereditary monarch - plays the "dignified" role which is above partisan politics, while the head of government - prime minister - perform the "efficient" function with dealing and wheeling in party politics.
In other words, the monarchy is useful because s/he could stay above party politics and free from electoral pressure to be the focal point of loyalty and allegiance of the citizens.
In contrast, president in presidentialism is both the head of state and head of government. S/he by default cannot be non-partisan. And citizens cannot separate his/her dual capacities.
After all, could an American curse President George W Bush as the head of his Republican administration and then without any psychological stress pledge loyalty to him as the head of the United States?
It is for this reason, a constitutional monarch should minimise the use of his/her discretionary power even when such power is reserved for him/her on appointment of prime minister and dissolution of parliamentary. S/he is certainly not meant to be a power broker involved in or facilitating negotiations on government formation.
When a monarchy gets itself too deep into party politics, the royal dignity will be lost, and this may undermine its very raison d'etre and risk ushering republicanism, as what has happened in Nepal and perhaps in Thailand.
In discussing the role of monarchy in politics, let us not forget the insightful and compelling defence of constitutional monarchy by Bagehot, unless we have a different agenda.
Strong parties needed
Because the executive is indirectly elected by the legislature, and survives on the confidence of legislatures, resulting in "fusion of power" rather than "separation of power", party becomes a necessary mechanism to organise lawmakers.
If parties are weak, with lawmakers defecting at whim or defying party disciplines, then no team work can be possible within either the government or opposition. And without durable and disciplined parties, there is simply no way for citizens to hold the government or opposition responsible.
In contrast, under presidentialism, weak parties will result in weak check-and-balance on the executive by the legislature, but the executive theoretically can function well as the president has a personal mandate that allows him/her to build a working team.
Because the centrality of party in the parliamentary system, standard Westminster convention would simply have lawmakers to elect their party leader (different from "party chairperson" who is more the chief administrator of party machine), who will then select his/her teammates to be the party's frontbench, which is cabinet if the party is in power, or shadow cabinet if it is the largest opposition.
Hiring and firing of a party leader is then done by the party caucus, the gathering of all the party's lawmakers. In the event of vacancy due to resignation or death, the caucus will meet and elect their new chief, who may reshuffle the frontbench.
Subject to rules and regulations, any lawmaker can also pose a leadership challenge and ballots will be cast by the caucus to decide between the incumbent and the challengers.
Note that there is no such need for "vote of no-confidence" in the party caucus, because as the party will always need a leader, the existing leader can only be ousted only when there is a viable alternative.
Many people talk about "vote of no-confidence" as the only way to resolve a power struggle in government when it is actually an anomaly.
"Vote of no-confidence" is an inter-party tool for the opposition to bring down a government, not an intra-party mechanism for ruling party/coalition to resolve their leadership rivalry.
In November 1990, Margaret Thatcher faced both leadership in the Conservative Party and a motion of no-confidence in the House of Common.
Internally, the Conservative parliamentarians voted in her favour by 204 to 152, which was not decisive enough to conclude her victory, leading her to resign gracefully to avoid the second ballot. Externally, the Conservative beat the opposition on the vote of no-confidence by 367 to 247, with not a single parliamentarian defected.
Hence, the Conservatives got to choose their new leader internally. The Queen did not have to decide whether to consent to request to dissolve Parliament, or judge which parliamentarian could command the confidence of majority of his/her peers.
Hence, one can only imagine two circumstances why a ruling party/coalition would use "vote of no-confidence" against its own leader (head of government), which is actually akin to a "backbench revolt", except that frontbenchers may join in too.
First, the ruling party/coalition is breaking up or breaking down, hence, convening a party caucus is simply not possible. Second, the head of government is completely shameless if a party caucus has indeed been called and s/he has been voted out.
Firing the CEO, ala Malaysia
The Malaysian way of ruling parties firing their head of government is different because of three additional layers of complexity:
a) Party leadership is elected not by lawmakers.
b) Governments consist of coalition partners, not just one party.
c) For state governments, coalition decision is made at the federal and not state level.
Hence, if the standard Westminster full procedure is logically laid out in three steps:
1. Defeat in caucus ballot
2. Vote of no-confidence (unimaginable)
3. Dissolution (optional)
but should conclude by the first step; the Malaysian version is slightly different:
1. Party disendorsement
2. Vote of no-confidence
3. Dissolution (optional)
As Malaysia is a land of endless possibilities, there was one instance where a menteri besar who shamelessly refused to resign even after losing a vote of no-confidence.
That happened in Kelantan in 1977. Similar to Khalid Ibrahim, Mohamed Nasir - a MB from PAS and rejected by his own party, but backed by PAS' then allies Umno and MCA - created a constitutional crisis only to be "resolved" with Emergency rule courtesy of the federal government.
In the case of Selangor, if the much-awaited PAS central committee meeting on Aug 17 agrees with PKR and DAP on the removal of Khalid, then step 1 is done.
But if Khalid then still defies Pakatan Rakyat's disendorsement on the ground that the coalition does not represent the people's will, he could stay on until November when the state legislature is scheduled to be convened and the vote of no-confidence can be tabled.
Should the palace intervene?
Does this make the case for the palace to intervene?
Certainly not. First of all, under Article 55 of Selangor state constitution, convening the legislature is not something the sultan can do outside the advice of state executive council (effectively, the MB).
If His Royal Highness does so, he would first create a new constitutional crisis before resolving the political crisis.
If the Aug 17 verdict is "Yes", Pakatan should convene its Selangor caucus and let its 44 state representatives decide between Khalid and PKR’s choice Wan Azizah Wan Ismail.
This would deny Khalid any excuse to stay on, as his power does indeed come from his party colleagues in the House. Until Malaysia adopts presidentialism, no one can question the legitimacy of the caucus procedure.
Also, Wan Azizah enjoying the confidence of majority of the House would be an undisputed fact, needing no royal judgement.
This means a revised procedure for firing head of governments in Malaysia:
1. Party disendorsement
2. Defeat in caucus ballot
3. Vote of no-confidence (unimaginable)
4. Dissolution (optional)
Will Khalid still want to cling on to power in face of all these? I think everyone should give him a chance to decide.
But in no way the sultan should be dragged through the mud of party politics.
Politicians can be dirty but the constitutional monarch must stay clean, if we want constitutional monarchy to stay strong and healthy. -M'kini

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