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10 APRIL 2024

Monday, November 24, 2014

SEAT INCREASE: Umno-BN's SECRET WEAPON to appease infighters, wipe out Pakatan

SEAT INCREASE: Umno-BN's SECRET WEAPON to appease infighters, wipe out Pakatan
The Malaysian Parliament and state legislatures are normally expanded every two elections because they are essentially welfare organisations for politicians so that Barisan Nasional can keep its inter-party and intra-party unity.
Coalitional unity in national disunity
From a point of system design, Umno’s electoral one-party state is a state-of-the-art machine.
On one hand, it uses the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system to turn elections into gambles and send voters into “do-or-die” anxiety of ethnic survivals.
On the other hand, the BN coalition holds together its component parties – mostly mono-ethnic and once totalled at 14 – together since 1974 (since 1952 if you count from the Umno-MCA Alliance in the first Kuala Lumpur municipal elections).
In contrast, opposition coalitions are short-lived that none has survived two full parliamentary terms so far.
The fairy-tale explanations offered are (a) BN parties have similar ideologies – “moderate” if you like – therefore, they don’t fight among themselves; (b) BN parties are mature enough to resolve their differences through the proper channels like “consultations behind closed door”.
Nothing can be further from the truth than the first fairy tale. Umno and MCA exist to protect the ethnic community they claim to champion from the threat of the other ethnic community their ally claims to champion.
The second fairy tale is also an illusion. BN parties, too, attack allies in the open but they close rank rather fast.
If you need a reminder of both these facts, just follow Umno’s starting this week.
So, how does BN manage to keep its own unity when its survival depends on communal politics that splits the nation? In other words, how does it poison the well in the village but stay unpoisoned?
The 1959 Umno-MCA Crisis over parliamentary seats
The simple answer is “power sharing”, which reads “more jobs, more perks, everyone is happy.”
BN’s forerunner – the Alliance – almost broke down before the 1959 elections, just after it won 51 out of 52 seats contested in 1955.
MCA under Dr Lim Chong Eu demanded to contest in one-third of parliamentary constituencies which Umno refused. The crisis was resolved only when MCA was split and Dr Lim was pushed aside.
Tunku Abdul Rahman made clear that Umno would work only with those in MCA would work with Umno. Eventually, MCA got more seats than initially offered but less than the one-third it demanded.
The 1959 crisis was illuminating as it revealed the zero-sum game nature of communal politics.
MCA demanded one-third of seats to contest because it wanted to have the veto power to check Umno from passing any unilateral constitutional amendment. It feared that Umno would succumb to the electoral pressure from PAS to become more pro-Malay, which would deplete the Chinese support for MCA.
Exactly because of that, Umno could not afford to give in to MCA’s demand. Giving MCA the constitutional veto power would be perceived as Umno kowtowing to the Chinese, and PAS would use it to seize Malay votes from Umno.
When the currency is relative strength, by definition it is a zero-sum game, and you can’t have two winners. Umno survived the 1959 crisis but MCA started its long decline as the Chinese ethnic champion.
Power sharing, job creation, mathematical regression
How to save the Alliance/BN from similar show-down so that Umno can continue to expand without explicitly hurting its allies’ credibility?
Mathematical regression. Forget about “relative strength”, which involves multiplication (x) and division (/). Just look at “absolute possession”, which requires only addition (+) and subtraction (-).
From 1969 until 2008, keeping four ministerial posts was an indicator of MCA’s status in BN, never mind the cabinet size had expanded over time and MCA ministers’ weight decreased.
Dyscalculia is bliss. If you can only count but cannot do division, you can be contented.
In that sense, BN’s much-touted formula of “power sharing” is actually all about “job creation”. Create more jobs in legislature and government – which of course come with perks and business opportunity – then everyone can be happy.
This explains why after the 2004 landslide, which landed BN with 199 out of 219 seats, PM Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi created a 75-member administration, that every one out of three BN parliamentarians was on the executive’s payroll.
This also explains why PM Datuk Seri Najib Razak expanded rather than reshuffled the cabinet, with 10 ministers in the Prime Minister’s Department (one fewer from forming a football team).  He did not want to make enemies within Umno and BN by axing their jobs.
After all, Najib is ever ready to cut subsidies for ordinary citizens, but not jobs for politicians.
EC – the Employment Commission for politicians
In that sense, the EC which officially stands for “Election Commission” is actually “Employment Commission” for politicians.
In 1911, the United States’ House of Representatives had 435 members. In the recently concluded election, it still has 435 members, but the American population has grown from 94 million in 1911 to 317 million now.
So, how do the Americans keep their Congress from bloating? Very simple, seats are cut from states with negative or slower population growth to be given to states with higher population growth.
In Malaysia, the Election Commission only recommends seat increases. It never cuts jobs. This pleases not only BN politicians, but even the opposition ones.
Seat increase: ‘win-win’ for BN and opposition
Known by few outsiders, seat increase has an important role in preventing BN’s infighting.
Take Greater Johor Baru, for example.  BN won all four parliamentary seats of P158 Tebrau, P159 Pasir Gudang , P160 Johor Bahru and P161 Pulai, with a slim majority of 52.45% combined.
Except for P160 Johor Baru where veteran Tan Sri Shahrir Samad who won handsomely with 56.46% of votes and a comfortable margin of 10,134, the other three registered less than 53% support for BN, with 50.54% and a slim margin of 935 votes for P159 Pasir Gudang (see map 1).
If the boundaries remain unchanged, a swing of 3% across the board will see BN losing all these weaker seats to Pakatan Rakyat.
And given the electoral landscape, with polling districts supporting BN and PR scattered and criss-crossed each other, there is a limit to what gerrymandering can do to maintain BN’s 100% hegemony with a mere 52.45% majority.
Very likely, out of the four parliamentary constituencies, two or three would remain very marginal for BN.
As the EC cannot save all Shahrirs, Nur Jazlans, Normalas and Soo Sengs or their successors, they would likely lobby the EC to save them at their expense of some of their colleagues. This may then lead to inter-party or inter-faction conflicts, resulting in sabotage or non-cooperation in election.
Map 1: the four parliamentary constituencies in Greater Johor Baru won by BN.Map
1: the four parliamentary constituencies in Greater Johor Baru won by BN.
Dark blue: polling districts won by BN with more than 55% of votes
Light blue: polling districts won by BN with 50%-55% of votes
Magenta: polling districts won by Pakatan with 50%-55% of votes
Red: polling districts won by Pakatan with more than 55% of votes
Map 2: Possible redelineation of Greater Johor Baru into five parliamentary constituenciesMap
2: Possible redelineation of Greater Johor Baru into five parliamentary constituencies
The problem can be easily resolved by creating a new seat. Map 2 shows a potential redelineation plan with five seats.
Johor Baru is now cut into two – Johor Baru Timur will be a give-away to Pakatan, with a standing 17,029 margin. But BN will get to keep Johor Baru Barat (the remnant of old Johor Baru) and Pulai with slightly stronger margin, and turn Pasir Gudang and Tebrau into strongholds with margins above 7,000.
And this has nothing to do with malapportionment. Currently, the constituency sizes range from 90,482 (Tebrau) to 101,041 (Pasir Gudang).
The new constituencies would be even more equally apportioned – ranging from 78,124 voters (Pulai) to 79,034 (Johor Baru Barat). (All figures are based on the GE13 data.)
Instead of possibly losing two to three seats to the opposition, BN will concede one to the opposition to retain all four others.
Hey! It’s “win-win” for both BN and the opposition, as long as you limit your mathematical calculation to counting. More jobs and everyone is happy!
Now, that is one of the reasons BN has survived so long. –TMI

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